This paper presents the contrast of two traditions within philosophy, the absolutist and relativists positions in relation to psychological counseling. It is argued that the problems presented to philosophical counseling in working out a suitable method cannot be divorced from the larger debates within philosophy. The techniques and assumptions of these two traditions will lead counselors and clients in very different directions and provide very different answers to the kinds of questions engaged.
I. Introduction
In an article published in 1995, Louis Marinoff outlines what he considers to be the proper relationship between counselors and counselees engaged in a discussion of ethics.
1 Marinoff states, "the counselor should refrain from imparting or imposing substantive moral views" in the discussion of a counselee's moral and ethical problems.
The counselor must retain a "hands-off" approach, and resist any temptation to assert his or her opinion to the counselee. Only in this way can the "dignity, autonomy, and responsibility" of the counselee be maintained. This relationship must be maintained even if the counselee requests such advice.
Marinoff's prescription is driven by the most noble of intentions. He asserts that counselors should maintain a professional stance, resisting the role of authority figures dispensing moral instruction. To this end, the counselors must be able to assist the counselees in seeing new ways of thinking about their problems, highlighting the consistencies and inconsistencies among beliefs, values, and potential outcomes of action. In the role of facilitator, the counselor must maintain his or her neutrality by adopting what Marinoff calls "meta-ethical relativism" towards the various moral belief systems.
However, there is a problem with such an approach. Meta-ethical relativism is a philosophical position. Assuming that the context in a counseling setting is one in which there is dialogue between the counselor and the client, it is also likely to assume that there will be a learning process taking place within the exchange. While a case can be made for the "desirability" of clients adopting ethical relativism, philosophical counseling at a minimum needs to be self-conscious of the implications of such a stance.
There can be no neutral stance in philosophical counseling. Contrary to the views of Ran Lahav, 2 and others, philosophic counseling is an intervention. It has no neutral ground on which to stand in the processes of birthing new ideas. Empowering a worldview is a political stance in that it seeks to enact a particular mode of life, a complete form of being that is internally consistent. The very nature of the process will result in the views being reproduced and disseminated in the culture. To put it another way, there is no technique of discourse that can be separated from its content, as the technique is essential to the generation of the ideas and principles that make up that content. This paper will represent the contrast of two traditions within philosophy, the absolutist and relativists positions. It will be argued that the problems presented to philosophical counseling in working out a suitable method cannot be divorced from the larger debates within philosophy. The techniques and assumptions of these two traditions will lead counselors and clients in very different directions and provide very different answers to the kinds of questions engaged. Not only is there is no technique by which an "objective" answer to philosophical question can be reached, but there is no discussion that can be generated outside of the various schools of philosophy. This implies that there is no technique by which a counselor can remain totally neutral. Given this condition the best outcome will result from the complete honesty between the counselor and the client with regard to the assumptions engaged. This will generate trust between the counselor and the client and enhance the chance for meaningful outcomes to be achieved.
II. Socrates and the Origins of Absolutism
It is natural that a practice in its infancy would go back to its roots in order to formulate its position and carve out its place in the world. Such is the case with the philosophical counseling. In addition to representing the origins of Western philosophy, the value of the Greeks for philosophical counseling is represented in a conception of life as an integrated process, with philosophy as its guide. As Martha Nussbaum describes in an open inquiry into all possibilities, but a methodology that would bring the individual to an understanding of fixed and eternal "truths." The goal of the dialectic is to always move discourse toward the unity of "being" and "knowing" in the realm of the forms.
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When the mind has an understanding of the forms, it is able to order the world according to the pure form of being.
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Therefore, to Socrates the method of the dialectic cannot be separated from the "doctrine of the forms." Discussed in Book Seven of the Republic and in the Parmenides the doctrine of the forms provides both an epistemological underpinning for the Socratic method and an ontological claim about "being" in the world. The dialectic is a process of questioning, but towards an integrated understanding of "truth" and "being."
Socrates' theology of "being" would be little more than an interesting story except for the fact that it inspired a transcendentalist tradition in Western philosophy. Plato's transcendentalism inspired elements of Augustine's thought. In the modern period, Descartes and Kant also were engaged in developing a transcendentalist logic for their philosophic systems. Within this tradition, sense experience is judged to be either inconsequential to the real purpose of human life (Augustine) or only the stimulus to the mind in its uncovering of transcendental truth (Descartes and Kant). Each of these systems, in their own way, diminished the role of experience and human judgments about those experiences in daily life.
From this perspective, the apparatus of experience, the human body, cannot be the source of knowledge. Knowledge is treated as reflecting a project of defining eternal being, whether treated as "forms," "things in themselves," or "universal reason." Such knowledge can only come from reason, transcendentally conceived, as it separates from the "shadows" of sense experience.
Discounting experience as the source of knowledge engages a number of implications for social life that would likely pose problems for some aspects of philosophical counseling. Following the lead of Socrates, this tradition defines "knowledge" as pertaining to that which is stable and unchanging. This includes knowledge of human beings. The subject is treated as a complete and stable object, to which an identity is assigned. "Being" cannot be assigned to that which undergoes change.
This issue has significant implications for the discussion of morals and ethics. In
Socrates, medieval theology, and in modern transcendentalist philosophies (ie. Kant) it is asserted that moral and ethical principles are to be divorced from experience. To use experience inductively, to draw ethical conclusions from experience, would leave us in a situation in which ethics was a subjective preference rather than an eternal truth. Thus, ethical norms would be a reflection of historical forces and subjective interests. Ethics would be less certain. There would be no firm foundation on which to build ethical life.
In a counseling setting, however, what happens when a client has a problem that is directly related to the process of social and historical change? Three areas likely to be part of any problem that brings a client to a counselor are; sex, family, and work. Are In all of these cases, the absolutist tradition looks to static concepts, to foundational support, in formulating a response to the client. Looking outside of history and experience will lead to a set of suggestions that reject creativity, adaptability, and change in favor of conformity to existing and well-worn principles. In a counseling setting, however, there is always the question of what is in the best interest of the client, especially if the client's experience is not to be the source of resolution.
III. The Philosophers of Change: Sophism, Materialism, and Postmodernism
Also with origins in ancient Greece is a tradition that is decidedly different in its approach to knowledge, human subjectivity, and ethics. This tradition is "antifoundationalist" in its assumptions, rejecting the idea that defining a fixed character of "being" represents the central mission of philosophy. As such, it has a more open and relativistic approach to knowledge, ethics, and the social practices of life.
In ancient Greece this position was represented in a tradition known as sophism.
One of the leading proponents of sophism was Protagoras, a contemporary of Socrates.
Protagoras maintained a position in sharp contrast to Socrates on the issues of sense experience, knowledge, and artistic expression. transformed by the experiences they have as part of the historical process.
In the Twentieth Century the poststructuralists have developed the idea of materialism into a theory of knowledge that contextualizes the generation of "truth" in the world, severing the links between the process of discourse and the capturing of the world's essential "being." The poststructuralists reject the idea that knowledge reflects a transcendental "forms," or absolute being. To paraphrase Nietzsche, "truth" represents a The quality of change is also another issue. Not all change is good change and the quality of change cannot be ignored. Fads, peer pressure, and conforming to trends, can equally produce a condition with which the client is ultimately uncomfortable, if change is grasps for its own sake.
On issues of sex, family, and employment, the relativist view presents striking alternatives to the more static conception of subjectivity. If one accepts the view that mores, ethics, and practices are driven by historical conditions as experienced by the subject, then adapting to changes in context will be perceived as part of the natural processes of human existence. Within the relativistic context, there can be no static condition of the "normal" to which the individual must be conditioned. Birth control and abortion rights have altered the context for sexual relations in the Western world. From this perspective, the ethics of sex have changed as a result of the technology. The family, as a unit for the reproduction of society, has undergone a change as images of "alternative lifestyles" disseminate through various forms of communications media. Work has also undergone a change, from the decline of labor unions to the increasing number of telecommuters in the information age.
The ethics of new practices are always a story to be told. A client's search for a "sense of self" within this larger process of historical change is likely to be one of the ongoing issues within philosophical counseling. The choice for the individual involves either a retreat into more static concepts or a process of becoming more comfortable with change and incorporating change into a sense of personal identity.
IV. The Counselor's Role
"Meta-ethical relativism" is a stance within the context of Western philosophy.
How can the counselor's role be defined in a way that not only takes into account this conflict in philosophy, but also confronts the other areas of tension within philosophy?
To put this another way, what responsibility does the counselor have in confronting the perennial questions of philosophy in a setting in which someone is seeking assistance to a concrete problem? As stated above, there is no neutral ground on which to stand, as even framing the questions represents a "leading" of the client in one direction rather than another. (Something for which Socrates represents the quintessential example!) There is no escape from the personal biases and conceptual frameworks that a counselor will use in analyzing a particular circumstance.
There are three ways to address this problem. The first approach is to limit the role of the counselor to that of "midwife." In this case the counselor assists the client in articulating a questions and then offers the variety of solutions that the history of Western (and perhaps Non-Western) philosophy has to offer. In this model the counselor has the role of facilitating the client's understanding of the range of choice that such a question can generate. In this "smorgesborg" approach, the client can simply select a response with which he or she is most comfortable and which seems to best solve the immediate problem.
The attraction of this approach is that it comes as close to some ideal of neutrality as seems possible, given the limits of our abilities in that area. In this setting the client should have the freedom to express his or her ideas and come to a resolution with which they are comfortable. The counselor is in the relatively "safe" role of facilitator, avoiding taking a position that might challenge or push the client to alternative understandings of the conditions in question.
However, the supposed neutrality comes at a cost. In the role of "living encyclopedia" the counselor must also stay somewhat disengaged. This is likely to produce an effect in which real dialogue is sacrificed for the sake of maintaining an antiseptic separation between client and counselor. In that context a "real" and honest exchange cannot take place. This setting is likely not to produce dialogue, and it is likely not to be greatly beneficial to either the client or the counselor.
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The second option pushes the client by having the counselor take a position contrary to that of the client's position in the course of discussions. While not strictly a "dialectical" strategy, it may be that confronting an opposite position may lead a client to explore resolutions previously not considered. This can have the effect of pushing the client to become more conscious of his or her own beliefs, as they find themselves continually forced to construct and articulate a reply to the challenges of the counselor.
Obviously, this can be a rather confrontational strategy and can lead estrangement between the client and counselor if taken to an extreme.
The third approach takes as it premise the impossibility of finding true "neutrality." Therefore, such a strategy seeks to adjust the relationship between counselor and client in a way that opens up dialogue. In this context the counselor is free to express an opinion only after a "full disclosure" of the beliefs and biases held by the counselor. In this setting there is no surreptitious agenda. The "cards are put on the have the opportunity to grow and change as part of the process. As many clients are likely to seek assistance to specific problems, they may benefit from the expression of alternative viewpoints that recast their problems in new ways. It also demonstrates respect for the client, as they are treated as a human being capable of engaging in the real exchange of ideas, rather than as an object to be kept at a distance.
Obviously, this does not mean that the counselor should not be sensitive to a range of possible solutions to a given problem. However, by encouraging an exchange of assumptions and premises at the outset the counselor and client have the best chance to engage in the kind of discussion that leads to personal growth. This approach will not be for all clients and counselors. Some counselors may find it difficult to expose themselves in the process of counseling. Some clients may simply want their own positions clarified or want their own ideas echoed back to them. However, for those seeking a real dialogue, philosophical counseling has the potential to provide a beneficial experience.
An experienced counselor is likely to employ all three of these techniques.
Providing an array of possibilities is a good place to start. One has to assume that the clients are there to explore new ways of thinking. In that case, challenging the client to explore alternatives is necessary to that process. However, in all of those discussions the counselor should be very honest with the client in relating their own views and biases
(often a very difficult task). The counselor can not lose sight of the fact that they are also building a relationship, and that can only be accomplished with an honest exchange of ideas.
V. Conclusion
Even as a new profession, philosophical counseling cannot escape the ancient debates of philosophy. How do we make claims to knowledge? What is the nature of human subjectivity? Are we products of will or conditions? Today, even the debate between Socrates and the sophists over the issue of payment for philosophical education has returned. Does taking payment turn philosophy into a commodity, implying tacit support of the institutions of capitalism and private accumulation? Answers to such questions will not rely on facts, but on assumptions.
So where does this take philosophical counseling in the future? It must be recognized that counseling activity does not imply a sterile relationship between counselors and clients. Both counselors and counselees have assumptions about the world. However, at its most basic level, counseling is an activity of exploration between two people to solve a practical problem using an array of techniques and ideas. But, as the example of Socrates is perhaps most illustrative, technique cannot be separated from content because it assigns validity and significance to the concepts employed.
The tension between absolutism and relativism is only one such matter that will influence the context of discussions. Does the counselor, as Marinoff suggests, assume "free will" in order to make the counselee a morally responsible agent? 17 Should the counselor assume wage labor is a form of "slavery" as a precondition to workplace problems? Is the body a locus of "sin" or is a life of sensual pleasure something to be enjoyed for its own sake? These are fundamental questions, and to suggest that a counselor will not let his or her beliefs filter through in the counseling process is as misguided as it is misdirected.
Ironically, I agree with Marinoff with regard to the likely outcome of philosophical counseling's evolution. "Just as with psychological/psychiatric counseling, in which Freudian, Jungian, Adlerian, Reichian, Laingian, eclectic, and many other models may be applied, practical diversity can serve to enrich, rather than to impoverish, the experience of counselor and counselee alike." 18 I believe that this statement is not only true, but it is the key to the development of philosophical counseling's future as a profession. Freudians, Jungians, as well as the other schools of psychological counseling, do not hide their biases. They revel in them. Clients seek out counselors, not in spite of their beliefs, but because of them. They are expected to bring those biases into the counselor/client relationship. Philosophical counseling should not be so lofty or myopic that it does not see both the desirability and the necessity of such a condition.
17 Marinoff p. 180. 18 Marinoff p. 181.
